Hmm ... apparently, Oliver Wood, and by extension Sean Biggerstaff, will not be in the Prisoner of Azkaban movie. *sadness* (Though it does raise a few questions, though. If Sean Biggerstaff isn't in the movie -- not that he just won't have any lines or anything, but that he's not going to appear *at all* -- then what does that mean for the Quidditch scenes? No Quidditch captain means no substantial game scenes ... unless, of course, we see a little CG Wood flying around in the background. ^_^; It's okay if they cut out the bit with the Quidditch Cup and Wood's obsessiveness -- though that would make me sad, because that part amused me -- but this will mean Cedric won't get his introduction. You know, the Hufflepuff victory that he wanted that he wanted invalidated? T_T)

*sigh* Anyway. I feel like I don't have much interesting about my life to report on right now. Finals are coming up, and then spring break ... Classes are fine, and work is fun. *shrug* Sakura Con is less than a month away -- but since there's so much other stuff happening in the meantime, I'm not too focused on it. Hopefully, I'll remember how excited I was back in December -- although it seems I'm never more eager for con than when its furthest away. ~_~

Not that this matters; I'll keep talking anyway. XD I have a question about debate that's been bothering me, because it seems to be coming up a lot lately -- what is it with the abuse of the concept of intention in determining the morality of an action? I think we're all clear that it's typically more blameworthy if you meant to do something than if it were an accident -- hence things like involuntary manslaughter, etc. But since when did it become acceptable to say that it's all right to do something when you're fully aware of the (theoretically immoral) consequences, as long as you don't *intend* those particular consequences?

Let me explain with some examples, because I know it doesn't make sense to me in the abstract. O.o We read an article in philosophy class by a man who was trying to differentiate between euthanasia, which is moral, and suicide, which is not. (Why he thinks suicide is not only a bad idea, but an actual moral wrong, is ... interesting. But I won't waste space going into it.) Acceptable euthanasia, he says, are all "passive" actions -- when one *refrains* from doing something in order to *let* a terminal patient die, rather than actively doing something that causes death. So you can refrain from giving lifesaving treatment, but you can't unplug someone from life support. (I don't like this idea either. But that's not relevant to my point, so moving on ...) You can, however, give a person painkillers in dosages that will kill him or her, and it'll be okay. The reasoning is this: if the only way to relieve a person's pain is to give him or her an amount of painkillers that actually causes death, then it's acceptable, because the intention is to ease the pain; death is not the *intention.*

Um, what? Ignoring the fact that the intent behind *all* euthanasia is the ending of pain, and not actually death (that's just the only way one can end the pain) ... this method of thinking says that it's okay to kill yourself (which is bad), even when you're fully aware that you are doing so, as long as you didn't really *mean* it that way. >_> A man who takes lots of painkillers in order to kill himself, and therefore end his pain, is committing suicide (i.e., being immoral). A man who takes them to end his pain -- and whoops, also causing his own death -- is good to go, with not a blot of suicidal immorality on his pristine soul.

If it happened once, I'd ignore it. But then -- oh, but then, remember the article I was writing my philosophy paper on? "Homosexuality is bad, marriage is good, sex is bad, but churning out young'uns is great!" Same concept. Sex is generally a bad thing, but it can be redeemed by procreation -- and by this we'll have to assume it's the *intent* of procreation, because pregnancy can not be ensured. So remember kids, if you're having sex, you're committing a moral wrong -- but if you're thinking "I want babies!" while you're doing the deed, then you've got nothing to worry about! (I spent 11 pages on this article. I'm a bit bitter. XD;;)

This popped up again while I was browsing the Abortion Debate. It's not as explicit an example, but the position could be manipulated to support a similarly constructed argument. Someone was trying to assert that birth control is immoral, because -- well, basically because the Church says so. (It's "unnatural" and all that -- I hate it when people try to pull such an empty argument). People pointed out that birth control pills can be used for other things than "convenience," such as regulation of menstruation cycles and reduction of PMS symptoms. So the original poster said that *that* use was okay ... but, um, they're still the same medicine. Just because one "intends" to take them as menstruation regulators doesn't mean they stop working as birth control. So a woman using the pill for this acceptably moral purpose could still rely on them to prevent pregnancy, hm?

Okay, rant over. Off to make some phone calls. ^_^